PROSTITUTION: GOVERNOR SUTIYOSO’S SOCIAL ENGINEERING IN TRANSFORMING LOKALISASI KRAMAT TUNGGAK INTO THE JAKARTA ISLAMIC CENTER

Sahruddin Lubis1* Hari Zamharir1
1Department of Political Science, Universitas Nasional
Email: sahruddin.lubis@civitas.unas.ac.id, hari.zamharir@civitas.unas.ac.id
*Corresponding Author: sahruddin.lubis@civitas.unas.ac.id

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Abstract

Governor Sutiyoso’s policy to transform Kramat Tunggak prostitution site into a center of religious activities seems to have no precedence, given his adoption of long-stage of social approach to executing the program and the corollary local government’s back-up by banishing bureaucracy to ensure the flow of the budget. The paper explores Sutiyoso’s social approach to the program of the closure of this site. The method used is qualitative research method along with the meta- analyses. The concepts used are social approach, deliberation, and banishing bureaucracy. The finding of the study is that the execution of terminating services at the prostitution site was successfully done and hardly any resistance appeared, and the bureaucracy of DKI Jakarta efficiently supported the execution.

Keywords: DKI Jakarta; Kramat Tunggak prostitution site; social approach; we-government; and deliberation.

INTRODUCTION

Urbanism as a way of life along with industrialization is generally associated with the emergence of prostitution—a sexual service defined as “a sexual intercourse characterized by barter, promiscuity and emotional indifference” (May in Pembayun, 2017:6). Demographic dynamic in a village in East Java that became industrialized poses problem of prostitution—with the local residents, numbering 45 % whereas the workers coming from outside the village of 55 %. The problem includes participating prostitutes of some local women who was catching up on the “urban” life style (Faizah & Sadewo, 2015: 5). Koentjaraniningrat (in Anindita & Sudarto 2019) conceptualizes it in conventional terms, mentioning prime regions across Java supplying prostitutes with economic factors; while current phenomena include non-conventional, either offline or online prostitution—becoming prostitutes may be of “life style” and a negative sense of freedom. These can endanger young adults. International trade and colonization are also parts of such dynamic that often bring with them the operation of prostitution: prostitution at the ship where women were made enter the Dutch ship in the
late 16th century Nusantara (Ingleson in Syahfrullah, 2020), or Bugis Street in Singapore which previously a business “cheap” center initiated by Bugis seamen from Indonesia at the end of 19th century. But then in 1970s during Vietnam War the US army made Bugis Street a place of “entertainment” (Dirgantara, 2019). In terms of cultural change, Javanese urban citizens, used to be taboo talking about sex in public, were first exposed to free information about Chinese sex herbal medicines from advertisements exposing a woman wearing only underwear, nearing the middle of the 20th century. In DKI Jakarta, it was in 1950, prostitutes coming from several localities across West Java were in operation. One of the localities was Indramayu that “produces” prostitutes as a consequence of high rate of divorce along with norms prevailing among the citizens—contending that being virgin divorced women and then became prostitutes is something common for them (Makhmuchik & Endrawaty, 2018).

Tackling the problem of prostitution is generally done through two ways—one way is making it legalized or lokalisasi and another way is banning it along with necessary regulation. Though minimum results are gained, it would also be a logical fallacy to think of not doing anything or providing no solutions, arguing illogically that prostitution has been in existence since the early history of humankind. Citizens may have been distrust in a mere legal approach to tackling the problem given the weaknesses of legal aspects that require reform (Hamidi, 2018; Wijaya, 2020; Sugama & Hariyanto, 2021). Therefore, an isolated definition is not enough. A government policy on prostitution would touch upon much broader aspects, especially the economic system of a city or a country. It would have to tackle such issues as the system, rationality of policy and the coherence—also considering the fact that the “culture” of prostitution, by definition, has been much more of MEN’s “cultural hegemony” (Rowbatham in Suud, 2019;7).

A very rare approach to the closure of “localized prostitution” was done by Governor Sutiyoso in DKI Jakarta in December 1999—the site at Kramat Tunggak that was legally localized since 1970 by the previous governor Ali Sadikin. As former military officer, Sutiyoso, a strong man, with long tenure as governor since the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), made an unprecedented social approach to the closure of Kramat Tunggak site: not only was his choice to transform the 10 hectare land into Islamic center but also his long-stage public discourse that ended up in his design to take the way of participatory empowerment for those who are to stop making a life at Kramat Tunggak site. The way Sutiyoso tackle the job had made the electronic newspaper bisnis.com. (18 June 2014) recommends: if the government of Surabaya Municipal City was to terminate prostitution site of Dolly, then they should replicate Sutiyoso’s way. The same voice was also expressed by a notable NU leader, Khofifah (Republika, 17 June, 2014).

The paper is an account of Sutiyoso’s strategy to terminate the legal prostitution at Kramat Tunggak site, involving his efforts to employ social engineering and the backup of banishing the bureaucracy to guarantee effective spending of the government budget. This rare approach is worth studying given its strength compared to the general cases of closure of legal sites—with normal procedure practiced by most government bureaucracies, i.e. more or less bureaucratic in nature, less public participation, policy choices that invite formal participation from the citizens.

RESEARCH METHODS

Our research method is qualitative research basing itself on empirical theory, with prime concept of data rich and theory poor. Construction of steps that were taken by DKI Jakarta will be done on a sequential mode. Social processes that were planned as social engineering which Sutiyoso did were described. Mattson’s concept of we-government that puts the citizens as partner in social development is applied (Mattson in Linders, 2012). The normative dimension of legal basis contending that the government prohibits any kind of prostitution is used in the study. Sources of data are documents of the government that are accessed through Google scholars, along with secondary data covering news available electronically in newspapers and articles of e-journals. An idea of bureaucratic reform, especially the concept Osborne’s banishing bureaucracy is applied in describing and the subsequent interpretation of the governor’s strategy—especially the crucial one that Osborne calls the core strategy (Osborne, 2007).
LITERATURE REVIEW

Seen from the perspective of state government, we-government—not a mere e-government—covers the significance of the concept citizen coproduction, placing the public as state government’s partners to "jointly tackle social problems" Mattson (in Linders, 2012:446). How to properly interact between local government and citizens? In social engineering within a state government, the partners are intervened in such a way so as to be constructive in development (Sarkar & Rahman, 2020). Adapting the idea of social engineering would be crucial to insure the attainment of a goal. In public work, the regulation of the Ministry of Public Works the Year 2009 defines social engineering as a multi-facet step of well-planned efforts, including strategies, in order for the parties achieve the goals. The main features are (a) needs assessment, (b) common goals orientation, (c) taking citizen’s capability into consideration, and (d) collaborative work (Susilowati & Windiani, 2018; 3-5).

Meanwhile, the legal aspect has been problematic. A number of studies on Indonesia’s legal basis for eliminating prostitution show a fundamental loop hole making legal approach ineffective. Rahayu (2020), who studies its law enforcement in Pahoe and the study by Melinda, Maulana and Habibi (2020) in the Serang Municipal City—known as “Negeri Seribu Ulama” (a region of thousand ulama)—find the weaknesses in law enforcement. The study by Subakti & Yudi (2019) on prostitution at Bantar Baru village, the Deli Serdang District, Sumatera, reveals that while the prostitution was made legal for the local-resources revenue of the local government or Pendapatan Asli Daerah, the law enforcement was not effective.

A judicial review addressed to a few issues at the Law of KUHP (Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Pidana) on adultery was brought by AILA (Aliansi Cinta Keluarga Indonesia or alliance of loving families) to MK or Mahkamah Konstitusi (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia); however, it was rejected with MK’s claim that the issues are the responsibility of law makers, not MK. AILA’s main point in their demand was to extend the concept of adultery that includes the practices done among LGBT (Humaidi & Hakim, 2018; 265).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The existing solutions to the problem by wiping out prostitution by the local and central governments have been to put the prostitutes in rehabilitating and re-socialization centers (Handayani, 2010; Rohim, 2011). This also applies in the case of Kramat Tunggak site in DKI Jakarta. Not aiming at making it legal, Governor Ali Sadikin had made efforts of re-socializing them, with the site popularly known as Lokres, lokasi resosialisasi, or center for re-socializing the prostitutes (Kompas.com, 22 June 2021). The scheme is then widely termed as lokalisisasi. Lokres of Kramat Tunggak in North Jakarta was initially “dibangun bagi menyadarkan, membina para penjahat seks di Jakarta yang kebanyakan digiring dari Pasar Senen, Kramat, dan Pejompongan” (designed for making prostitutes who provided sex services in Jakarta conscious to lead normal life. They were mostly collected from areas of Pasar Senen, Kramat, and Pejompongan). (Kompas.com. 16 February, 2016). The site used to be an area of swamps that was claimed to be horrifying —tempat jin buang anak (genies throw away their children). Bang Ali transformed it into a simple housing complex along with parking lots for the purpose. (Poskota.co.id). In reality, the site became quasi-legalized prostitution “Berkumpulnya pekerja seks dimanaaikan sejumlah mucikari dibujuk untuk bekerja kembali sebagai wanita penghibur”. (the prostitutes gathered were eventually benefited by a number of patrons or germo-s who persuaded the women to re-activate their work). Described as the area of limited inhabitants, the site of 11,5 hectares had only about 200 prostitutes along with 80 germo-s in 1970; in 1990s, sharp increase took place: about 2000 prostitutes and 228 germo-s. (Kumparan.com.). Similar situation is likely take place in other regions across the country: the policy to do lokalisisasi is then changed into the practice of prostitution. In Balikpapan, the Municipal City’s policy to terminate the lokalisisasi of KM 17 was done because of the mushrooming prostitution that extends from the original site in the city outskirt to the nearing city center (Zulfiqar, et.al. 2014).

Nationwide, reports from the authority in 2016 mention that out of 143 localized legal prostitution across the country, 54 sites were terminated, with spending of the respected local governments amounted to more than 16 trillion rupiyahs (Khofifah, 2019). In the meantime, Director General of Social Rehabilitation of the Ministry of Social Affairs claims that up to 2019, 162 prostitution sites have been terminated (Merdeka.com, 21 Nov 2019). Though reports say that the
main reason for terminating Kramat Tunggak prostitution site was the high rate of crime, diseases such as HIV/AIDS must also take place in DKI Jakarta. Data nationwide exposed by the ministry 2011 presents 216.400 citizens who are exposed to HIV/AIDS diseases; and Indonesia was positioned first level of transmitting HIV/AIDS. (Masakke, 2015; 2). A government’s policy to put prostitutes in a localized site for gradual rehabilitation or lokalisasi is also problematic: quoting the report of 2015 Interfaith Gender Relations, Anindia & Sudarto (2019; 21) indicates an increased number of prostitutes as an unintended consequence of a lokalisasi such that more sites for lokalisasi are then needed.

The first approach was to hold informal meeting amongst a few elites and the public to deliberate on policy choices. Deliberation in political communication was a reflexive of “goyong-royong democracy” as a talking centric democracy (Zamharir & Lubis, 2019) or consensus conference in the practice of Democracy’s Dharma of Taiwan (Palmer, 2019). Collecting the past policy was done; deliberating on his idea was also done by way of paying a visit to the former Governor Ali Sadikin: (a) asking for the past policy, (b) convincing him that there was a high need to do something given the current trend of social change prevailing in the area, and (c) expressing Sutiyoso’s desire to terminate the operation of the site.

Sumantri in mediaIndo.com (15 Feb 2016) reports that Hutahean, a task force team member, mentions three parties are to be made ready prior to the closure of the site—the patrons or mucikari, the prostitutes, and the local citizens that make a living there. As for the prostitutes, counseling was done long before the government destroyed the buildings in the area. For the citizens making a living there, public discourse was made by Sutiyoso; solutions to finding new jobs was discussed and followed-up. In the meantime, public discourse was held to brainstorm possible choices to transform the site into other activities. Of several project ideas, two main options emerged—the site became a business center and the site was used for Islamic center. Various segments of the society of DKI Jakarta were invited in the discourse—also in Sutiyoso’s opportunity to come across a few Indonesian scholars such as Azyumardi Azra in a foreign country, deliberation was made. It was after so many events for deliberation that a sudden desire of Sutiyoso made him make the choice—transforming the site into Islamic center. (Bahri, 08 February 2022). Sutiyoso’s sudden choice was made in an unprecedented serious statement, probably as a result of a very persuasive demand expressed by a Muslim preaching activist of DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Council of Islam Preaching). The preacher tried to be assertive that the governor would choose to build an Islamic Center. A sudden interruption was Sutiyoso’s bang of the table, out-crying, “No more discussing a business center. We build the Islamic Center!!” One may have expected that Sutiyoso would have had similar government policy on prostitution that he had observed and learnt in Thailand.

The second step taken by DKI Jakarta was to set up task force for planning and executing the program. Sumantri in mediaIndo.com (15 February 2016) reports that Hutahean, a task force team member, mentions three parties are to be made ready prior to the closure of the site—the patrons or mucikari, the prostitutes, and the local citizens that make a living there. As for the prostitutes, counseling was done long before the government destroyed the buildings. One notable preacher mobilized by Sutiyoso is Zainuddin MZ—known as a preacher of one million followers of Moslems. It was reported that many prostitutes attended Zainuddin MZ’s preaching: some wore Muslimah clothes, some other were in kebaya (typical Javanese clothes), and some others in T-shirts with long sleeves (Republika, July 10, 2011). For the citizens making a living there, public discourse was made by Sutiyoso; solutions to finding new jobs was discussed and followed-up. In the words of Hutahean, the social engineering of Sutiyoso is described: “Yang mau usaha dimodalin. Yang mau bekerja dibukakan lapangan kerja. Entah itu jadi satpam, petugas kebersihan, bahkan ada juga yang disalurkan ke tempat-tempat kerja. Intinya dicarikan pekerjaan.” (“Those willing to run a small business will be given working capital. Those willing to start new work will be given job opportunity. Be it a security officer, cleaning service person. Even some were made to be absorbed by the job vacancies. In short, jobs were made available”).

The resources mobilization includes (a) appointing the former governor Ali Sadikin as advisor to the Task Force; (b) the involvement of notable Islamic preachers to be assigned to provide spiritual and religious preaching/advice to the prostitutes. In the execution of the program, the Task Force also draft the questionnaires for the parties to be filled out. The design was to assess their needs. The
strategy involves banishing bureaucracy of the unit of the provincial apparatus designated to allocate working capital for those willing to start a small business to insure the quick flow of the fund. Also the measure to have the clusters work together, especially the cluster of the small business, that was to appoint “boss” responsible for disbursing the fund and monitoring its spending. See the following chart:

![Chart 01: The Mechanic of Sutiyoso's Social Engineering](attachment:image.png)

What was beyond all these: people may refer all these to a prime issue—i.e. the core strategy of Sutiyoso—making clear the purpose of actions. Core strategy “deals with the core function of govt: the steering function...is primarily about improving steering—about doing the right things, not doing things right” (Osborne, 2017; 3) As Osborne indicated, reinventing government includes the control strategy. What Sutiyoso did in setting up Task Force for it, mobilizing society’s resources, and having informal leaders do certain tasks was a reinvention. Osborne contends that “the control strategy pushes significant decision-making power down through the hierarchy, and at times out to the community” (Osborne, 2017; 11). The above may not suffice to show Sutiyoso’s strength; his capability should be more than what Osborne’s concepts and Mattson’s concept might convey. He was also a military officer of national level: though not gaining wide support, he once declared his candidacy for 2009 presidential election (Kingsbury, 2008).

CONCLUSION

From the security approach perspective, Sutiyoso should have been able to do so by force. But he did not. It would have been justified given the high rate of crime prevailed and Sutiyoso’s firm grip in power in DKI Jakarta. Instead, he adopted his social approach along with his social engineering: he gained both the solution to the problem of high crime rate as well as social acceptance by most segments of the citizens and those involved and were impacted by the policy. Concerning his social engineering that included mobilization of resources, Osborne’s idea of core strategy of Sutiyoso and the control strategy and his practice of Mattson’s we-government seem to have been done successfully by him and his team.
Sutiyoso’s adoption of social engineering in terminating Kramat Tunggak prostitution site can be seen as a “praxis” critique of the way the national government tackle the problem of prostitution. While the national government has relied heavily on simple strategy—re-socializing by way of training skills and rehabilitation in a more of limited dimensions—Sutiyoso’s strategy covers more complex processes whereby training skills is just one dimension of inputs, at the same time rehabilitation is meant much more of socio-cultural dimensions that call on longer duration. His strategy to set up the Task Force implies his discontent of the existing scheme of having executing unit of Dinas Sosial being the main unit in the bureaucracy.

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